John Ferguson Hume warns readers on many ways to lose money investing and speculating. The book represents a historical glimpse into Wall Street of the late 1800s and the timeless lessons of investor behavior.
The Acquirer’s Multiple by Tobias Carlisle
Tobias Carlisle breaks down how investors like Warren Buffett, Carl Icahn, and others take advantage of the powerful force in markets known as mean reversion, why it exists, the opportunities it creates, and how a deep value strategy captures it.
The Notes
Benchmarks and the Relative Return Bias
Absolute returns get a lot of lip service, but we have a relative return bias. Peter Bernstein weighed in on the bias and suggest benchmarks don’t help.
The downsides are fairly obvious. Relative returns feel great during bull markets. But when a year like 2008 comes around, you beat the benchmark but still lose big.
To add to it, fund managers (and advisors) also have career risk that feeds the relative return bias. All of it leads to more opportunities for short term thinking and poor behavior.
Seth Klarman simplified the problem perfectly: “You can’t think straight with a gun to your head. If you have a relative performance gun to your head, on the way down and on the way up, you’ll do the wrong thing every time. You’ll be liking them when they’re up, and hating them when they’re down – when you should be doing the opposite.”
Absolute returns should be the answer but investors contend with a powerful force: return envy. You have to be comfortable with “losing” to the Jones or an arbitrary index in any given year. What matters is “Are you earning a good return?”
Here’s what Bernstein had to say: Continue Reading…
Daniel Kahneman: The Most Important Bias
Casinos thrive because people are wrong about the odds. The same can be said about investing. The reason why is what Daniel Kahneman calls the “single most important bias.”
The odds of most gambling games can figured out using grade school math. In a totally rational world, where everyone was out to maximize their money, nobody would play any game that favored the House. But not everyone plays for maximum wealth.
So there must be something else going on. Entertainment plays a part. The bells and flashing lights and the quick play bring thrills.
Really, some people think they’re the exception the odds. Ed Thorp calls gambling a tax on ignorance: “People often gamble because they think they can win, they’re lucky, they have hunches, that sort of thing, whereas, in fact, they’re going to be remorselessly ground down over time.”
Kahneman chalks it up to optimism combined with confidence. He explained how it fits in the context of investing during a 2005 interview: Continue Reading…
The Elusive “Wonderful Company”
Probably the largest aggregate losses are suffered by people who invest overenthusiastically in a basically sound company. — Ben Graham
I was reminded of Graham’s quote after hearing something Joel Greenblatt said at a recent conference:
I’d like to own a great growth company that’s gonna continue to grow forever and there are some extraordinary companies out there that will continue to do well. I would say…people think there are a lot more companies that rhyme with those few companies that can do that, then there are, in reality. There probably are a few great businesses like that, and I’m not gonna argue that they’re great — I have to figure out which one’s they are first — but there will be some winners. And you’ll know their names because they won.
Sometimes the market views stocks through rose-colored glasses. It prices companies as if they’ve built an impregnable moat around them and they already won. Really, it’s an illusion. Continue Reading…
Bernstein and Montier Discuss “Risk”
Risk has a long list of definitions that make it unnecessarily confusing. Peter Bernstein sees risk as “the consequences of being wrong.” That’s a version I can get behind.
He contributed it to a great discussion with James Montier on how the different definitions of risks fit together, mainly whether volatility fits in and what it means for investing.
Ironically, Bernstein can see volatility as risk from a behavioral standpoint (hardly mathematical) because of the queasy feeling it creates. Montier sees volatility as opportunity.
In a sense, they’re both right. Volatility is the catalyst to a good or bad decision. The decision introduces the potential for risk — learned only in hindsight from the outcome.
Their discussion offers some food for thought: Continue Reading…
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