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The 10 largest U.S. companies now account for roughly 39% of the S&P 500. These companies are big for a reason. Most are growing high margin businesses. They trade at a premium relative to a typical company because they’re viewed as high quality.
The Dotcom Bubble’s insane P/E multiples can be seen on the left. The biggest companies barely had earnings back then. Everything was priced on hope.
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Continue Reading…After more than thirty years of studying stock speculation and speculators, I have arrived at the conclusion that, in the order of their importance, the principal contributory causes to the public’s losses during all booms are the following:
- The public itself. I mean the motives that make the public go to Wall Street. This is true of rich and poor, of heads of business houses and of salaried clerks, since all of them overstay the market. By “all” I really mean only 99.7 percent. Those who didn’t lose in ’29 lost in ’30 or ’31.
- Remediable evils. You might say, old trade customs, to Wall Street’s antiquated point of view. Many things are done or left undone by commission houses which tend to make more certain the certainty of losses by their customers. Nevertheless, I am convinced that commission brokers did less to damage the public that speculated than those banks and banking houses which worked by themselves or in association with promoters and pools and syndicates. They perceived that the public’s capacity for absorbing stocks was practically unlimited and they overcapitalized that appetite the way they overcapitalized everything else. Some day the history of the worse than blindness of our banks, bankers, and corporation heads in 1928 and 1929 will be written — and not believed.
- The average stockbroker’s perfectly human desire to do as much business as he can, when he remembers the long spells of fasting that go with the occasional gorging. — Edwin Lefevre (source)
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How do you invest money for the ultra-long term? This came as a question from a reader on how to invest a dynasty trust. It’s also a question that endowments, charities, and foundations face.
A few questions come to mind when the time horizon is a century or more. What obstacles exist around management? What type of investment philosophy do you embrace? How do you ensure that what’s set in motion doesn’t diverge from its initial path?
First, this a good but difficult problem to have. The hardest part is getting things setup properly from a legal and tax perspective (a bit outside my purview). The U.S. tax system is complex and requires estate planning expertise to legally maximize long-term tax savings in relation to the client’s goals.
On the investment side, three things come to mind when thinking in terms of a century or more.
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Continue Reading…My recommendation is that the investor choose either his own list of, say, 20 or 30 representative and leading companies, or else put his money in several of the well-established mutual funds…
Many investors would think my prescription too simple. If they can get results equal to the averages in this easy way why shouldn’t they try to get a substantially higher return by careful and competently-advised selection? My short answer has already been given: If the investment funds as a whole can’t beat the averages, even pretty clever investors as a whole can’t do it either. The underlying problem of selection is that the “good stocks — chiefly the growth stocks with better than average prospects — tend to be fully priced and often overpriced.” At the other extreme new stock offerings, when the craze is one, are likely to combine fourth-rate quality with absurdly high price-earnings ratios. There are better opportunities in between these extremes, but most investors don’t look for them there.
As I see it, the fundamental problem in common stocks is the market’s injection of a large speculative element into the strongest and best companies by establishing an untenably high price for them… This has added greatly to the confusion between investment and speculation, because it is easy to tell oneself that the shares of a good company are always a sound investment, regardless of price. — Ben Graham (source)
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A. Newton Plummer was a corporate publicist. He was also a stock promoter. He helped pool operators manufacture huge profits during the 1920s bull market.
A pool was a group of people that pooled their money to buy a stock, manipulate the price higher, and then sell it to the unsuspecting public at a huge profit. At the same time, PR was used to draw up publicity around the stock. That’s where Plummer came in.
Plummer wrote press releases filled with good news about the stock. He sent them to newspapers around the country in the hopes of being published. To guarantee it, of course, he bribed the reporters.
One example of this was the Armour & Co. operation run by Plummer:
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Continue Reading…The game is getting today as it always has and as it always will, for besides the greed motive in stock speculation there is also the call of adventure, the fascination of danger that, in turn, begets the curious delusion that a man’s profit must always be commensurate with the risk he takes. When a man stands to lose his all he thinks he ought at least to double it. You find this in every business. Even those to whom stock speculation appears immoral or stupid look through equally unreliable telescopes at the colossal fortunes won by the great captains of industry in a short, breathless decade. It was all they could play it for, because the game itself was not always worth much. To create, to do, to win — that is how and why they play it.
But what makes the game of stock speculation the most dangerous of all is the variety of pleasing disguises it is able to assume. Being born of greed, it feeds on greed and thereby waxes greater. If that were all it did, or if it did this openly, it would not be so dangerous; but besides the additional lure of adventure there is the irresistible appeal to vanity, the challenge to pit your wits against other wits, and even against Nature and the vagaries of the weather and the weaknesses of men. It most often masquerades as a legitimate business operation, subject to and governed by the ordinary rules of ordinary business. Of course, one reason for this is that the buying and selling of stocks do not necessarily constitute gambling. The buying or selling of stocks on margin in expectation of immediate and large profits is probably gambling and nothing else, whether or not you have a scientific system that cannot fail. — Edwin Lefevre (source)